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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WILFRED A. ROGALSKI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7982

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict recovered by plaintiff, Wilford A. Rogalski, for personal injuries sustained on January 18, 1952. Plaintiff was injured while working on and about property owned and
maintained by defendant, Phillips Petroleum Company, at
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Woods Cross, Utah. At the time he was injured, plaintiff
was engaged in steam cleaning a truck owned and operated by his employer, Parley_ Droubay, a distributor of defendant's products. While so engaged, plaintiff stumbled
into an op~n vat containing hot caustic soda, kept on its
premises by the defendant.
The cas·e was submitted to a jury with appropriate
instructions as to the definition of a business visitor or invitee and the duty of care owed to such a person. The jury
was specifically instructed that it could find for the plaintiff only if it first determined that he was a business visitor
upon the defendant's property. The jury returned a verdict
in plaintiff's favor.
This action was brought with specific authorization
of the State Insurance Fund and upon the understanding
that the State Insurance Fund would be reimbursed, in the
event of recovery, for the compensation payments made
by it to the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 18, 1952, plaintiff was an employee of one
Parley Droubay (R. 55). His job was to drive the trucks
in which defendant's products were distributed and to help
repair and clean said trucks (R. 55, 56, 121). Prior to the
acquisition of the Wasatch Oil Company facilities at Woods
Cross, Utah, by defendant, Phillips Petroleum Company,
Parley Droubay worked as a supervisory employee of
Wasatch Oil Company, in charge of that company's trucks
(R. 58) . At that time, Droubay used the concrete washing
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"

ramp, where the plaintiff was injured, to wash Wasatch
Oil Company trucks (R. 59). In so doing he used the same
steam cleaning equipment as was being used by the plaintiff at the time he was injured (R. 59). When defendant
took over these facilities, Droubay purchased some of its
trucks and since that time has acted as a consignee and
distributor of defendant's products (R. 33).
Droubay has been referred to as a "distributing agent"
(R. 90). There is and was, at the time of plaintiff's injury, a close business relationship between Droubay and
defendant (R. 33). Products ar~ consigned by defendant
to Droubay who distributes and sells them under defendant's trade name.
Droubay leases from defendant an office and parking
area which are located on the east side of the defendant's
maintenance building (R. 84). The washing ramp in question is located on the south side of the same building (R.
37). The office and parking area leased by defendant to
Droubay, the pumps and docks where Droubay's trucks
are loaded with defendant's products, and the washing
ramp in question are all located in the same enclosed yard
(R. 36) . He also had a right of way 50 feet wide leading
in from the street (R. 89) . Droubay had never felt that he
was confined in his operations to any particular area of
defendant's yard (R. 112-113).
Droubay, as noted above, used the washing ramp for
cleaning trucks while an employee of Wasatch Oil Company and continued to so use the ramp and cleaning equipment after the defendant took over the property (R. 58,
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59) . Defendant acquiesced in and permitted the use of
this ramp by Droubay for a period of almost three years
prior to the time plaintiff was injured (R. 60). Defendant
had at no time excluded Droubay from the use of this ramp
or objected to his use of the same, although it was practically the only place used by him for washing his trucks
(R. 60, 91). While on one occasion, Droubay was said to
have been refused a specific permit or agreement by one of
defendant's employees to use this ramp, he was not told
that he could not use it and in fact continued to so use it
with the acquiescence and knowledge of the defendant until
the date plaintiff was injured (R. 201). Droubay did not
even recall whether the request for permission included
the washing ramp (R. 116).
Droubay's trucks are painted with defendant's black
and orange colors. The trade name of defendant, "Phillips
66," appears on the sides of said trucks (R. 60, 117). This
provides a source of advertising for defendant's products
and the appearance of these trucks is naturally important
to the defendant. Defendant's Sales Department had told
Droubay that he should keep these trucks clean (R. 117).
It was while cleaning one of these trucks that plaintiff
i~
sustained the injuries complained of in this case.
On the day of the injury, plaintiff was requested by
Droubay to drive one of his trucks onto the washing ramp
or platform so that it could be cleaned (R. 124). Prior to
that day plaintiff had never been on the washing platform
or in its vicinity (R. 127). This washing ramp is bordered
on the left side by defendant's maintenance shop and
to the front by a sliding door leading into defendant's
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maintenance warehouse (R. 37, 68, Def's. Ex. 1). The
steam cleaning equipment was on the left side of the ramp
and the vat containing the caustic soda solution was on the
right side of the ramp near the front (R. 38). Pumps and
other objects cluttered the rest of the area to the right of
the ramp (R. 126, 127, 142). Plaintiff was told by his
employer that in driving onto the ramp, he should watch
carefully to the left in order to avoid splashing on the
windows of defendant's building (R. 124). After parking
the truck on the ramp, he got out of the left-hand side and
departed from the area to do some other work elsewhere
(R. 125). He did not see the caustic soda vat at that time
(R. 127).
The concrete slab or washing ramp on which the truck
was parked is 13 feet 11 inches in width and 61 feet 4
inches in length (R. 101). The truck is 7 feet 1 inch in
width from the outside fenders and 38 feet 11 inches in
length (R. 101). While the exact location of the truck was
not definitely established, there was approximately 3 to 6
feet in front of the truck and from 1 foot to 18 inches on
the right side between the truck and the edge of the
_ cement (R. 125, 102, 155). The vat was located just 2
inches from the right-hand edge of the ramp and near the
front (R. 139), and it would therefore have been no more
-· than 20 inches, at the most, from the right-hand side of the
truck. It stood from 13 to 14 inches in height above the
level of the ramp or about the same height as a man's shins
(R. 38, 143) . The vat was never used by Droubay or his
e¥Iployees in the cleaning of the trucks or otherwise (R.
61). It was customary for Droubay to ask permission of
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some of defendant's employees to use the washing ramp,
but he did not recall for certain whether this customary
practice had been followed on the day in question (R. 86).
After lunch, plaintiff and Droubay returned to the
washing ramp and Droubay started the steam cleaning
equipment and showed the plaintiff how . to operate the
same (R. 69, 70). Plaintiff had never operated this type
of equipment prior to this date (R. 127). It was a fairly
cool day in January and the steam cleaning equipment produced a great deal of steam and vapor, obscuring one's
vision for some distance (R. 131). Steam also continued
to rise from parts of the truck previously cleaned, due to
the heat having been applied to the cold metal (R. 165).
Plaintiff had cleaned the undercarriage on the front
end of the truck and was proceeding around the front
right-hand fender to clean the right side of the truck. His
right hip was touching the side of the truck (R. 132). His
vision was impaired by the steam from the cleaning apparatus (R. 132, 169). In walking around the fender,
plaintiff's foot came in contact with the side of the vat
causing him to lose his balance and stumble forward, and
in regaining his balance he put his left foot into the caustic soda solution (R. 132, 133). Plaintiff, at that time, was
not aware of the existence of this vat or of its contents (R.
133). There was no cover on the vat at the time and it
contained no barricade, warning or markings which would
indicate to one using ·the premises the presence of this
condition (R. 75). Plaintiff was not warned by any of
defendant's agents or employees of this hazard (R. 128) ·
Even had he noticed the vat when he parked the truck on
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the ramp, there was nothing to have warned him of its
dangerous propensities or that it was different from the
other empty tanks or objects placed in that area (R. 127).
This suit was instituted with the oral consent and
authorization of the State Insurance Fund. Prior to the
filing of an answer in this action, a formal letter from
David C. Thomas, Manager of the State Insurance Fund,
was filed (R. 9) . This letter stated in part:
"You are authorized to represent the interest
of the State Insurance Fund in attempting to procure the rei~bursement to the Fund for the amounts
which the State Insurance Fund has been required
to pay in this case, it being our understanding that
Mr. Rogalski's accident was caused by the fault
of a third party."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO
THE JURY - THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A
BUSINESS VISITOR AND THAT DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED THE DUTY OF CARE
OWED TO SUCH A PERSON.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR IN REFUSING
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS.
POINT V.
THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN PARTIES THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY AND
BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO
THE JURY - THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A
BUSINESS VISITOR AND THAT DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED THE DUTY OF CARE
OWED TO SUCH A PERSON.
It is difficult to differentiate in appellant's argument

(Point I) as to whether it is concerning itself with the

ques-1
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tion of whether the case was properly submitted to the jury
as to defendant's negligence, in violating the duty of care
owed plaintiff, or to the question of whether the plaintiff
was himself negligent. As the latter question is discussed
subsequently, we will conce.rn ourselves first with the issue
of defendant's negligence.
The question before this Court, of course, is not whether
the facts disclose negligent conduct on the part of the defendant, but only whether there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury could make su~h a finding. If there
was any evidence from which a jury could reasonably find
that plaintiff was a business visitor and that defendant
had violated the duty of care owed to such a person, then
the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. Stickle
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., . . . Utah ... , 251 P. 2d
867, 870 (1952).
The questions to be determined are, first, whether or
not there was any evidence from which a jury could infer
that plaintiff was a business visitor upon defendants premises at the time he was injured and second, if he was a
business visitor, whether or not defendant violated the duty
of care owed to such a person.

(a)

Plaintiff was a business visitor on defendant's premises at the time and
place he was injured.

Various terms are used in classifying those who
are injured while upon the property of another. The terms
"invitee," "business invitee" and "business visitor," as
used by the plaintiff in the record all refer to the same
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classification. Since this Court has adopted the classification used in the Restatement of the Law of Torts-trespasser, licensee' and business visitor-these terms will be
employed in this brief. In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah
444, 449, 182 P. 2d 119, 121 (1947).
Plaintiff alleged, in his complaint, that he was a business visitor. This was specifically denied in defendant's
answer (R. 1, 16). There was no other issue raised by the
pleadings as to plaintiff's status. Based upon the evidence
submitted at the trial, the Court instructed the jury on this
theory. The jury was specifically instructed that in order
for plaintiff to recover, it must first be determined that
he was a business visitor (R. 247). This inst~uction was
very favorable to the defendant since, under the evidence
disclosed at the trial and in light of the recent pronouncements of this Court, the plaintiff probably was entitled to
recover even though he was not a business visitor. See
Martin v. Jones, ... Utah ... , 253 P. 2d 359 (1953) in
which a judgment denying recovery to a trespasser was
reversed by this Court where defendant's employees knew
of his presence and failed to warn him of a known dangerous condition. Under the Court's instructions in the present case, the definition of and duty of care owed to a
licensee or trespasser was immaterial since the plaintiff's
case depended upon a finding that he was a business visitor.
The defendant urges •upon this Court a very artificial
and untenable conception of what constitutes a business
visitor. It is defendant's contention that the plaintiff's
status must be determined with a tape measure, based upon
the number of feet the place he was injured was from the
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point at which business was actually transacted, or whether
or not money was actually paid by the plaintiff (or his employer) to be where he was, or whether or not he had been
expressly invited to enter the particular area in question.
Not a single legal authority is cited for the proposition that
the above factors are determinative. The very enlightening
. . pronouncements of this Court on the subject are astutely
ignored in appellant's brief.

The Restatement of the Law of Torts defines a business visitor as follows :
"A business visitor is a person who is invited
or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them."
Restatement, Torts, § 332 (1934).
The following comments accompany this definition :
"Business visitors fall into two classes. The
first class includes persons who are invited or permitted to come upon the land for a purpose directly
or indirectly connected with the business which the
possessor conducts thereon * * * the second
class includes those who come upon the land for a
purpose which is connected with their own business
which itself is directly or indirectly connected with
any purpose, business or otherwise, for which the
possessor uses the land. Restatement, Torts, Vol.
2, p. 897.

"It is immaterial that the person is one whom
the possessor is not willing to receive as a business
visitor if the possessor's words or other conduct are
understood, and would be understood by a reasonable man, as indicating the possessor's willingness.
The nature of the use to which the possessor puts his
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land is often sufficient to express to the reasonable
understanding of the .public or classes or members
thereof a wl.llingness or unwillingness to receive
them. Restatement, Torts, Vol. 2, p. 898.

"It is not necessary that the visitor's purpose
be to enter into immediate business dealings with
the possessor. The benefit to the possessor may be
indirect and in the future." Restatement, Torts,
Vol. 2, p. 899.
The Restatement definition has been adopted and approved by this Court. In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah
444, 449, 182 P. 2d 119, 121 (1947) ; for a similar definition ·
see Prosser on Torts, Section 79.
Under the above definition, two elements are necessary
for one to obtain the status of a business visitor. First, he
must be invited or permitted to enter or remain upon the
premises of another and secondly, he must be there for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business
dealings between them. The two elements are necessarily
related and the greater the mutual benefit, the easier it is
to infer the invitation or permission. Nevada Transfer &
Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, 60 Nev. 87, 99 P. 2d 633, 636
(1940).
It is clear from this definition and the decisions of
this Court that the invitation to enter upon the premises
may be implied as well as express. See Hayward v. Downing, 112 Utah 508, 513, 189 P. 2d 442, 444 (1948) in which
this Court in referring to a business visitor or invitee stated
"he may be· expressly invited to come upon the premises,
but more commonly his invitation is implied." It is also
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sufficient if the person is only permitted, as contrasted
with invited, to be upon the property. The California
Supreme Court in Oettinger v. Stewa1·t, 24 Cal. 2d 122, 148
P. 2d 19, 21 (1944) has said:
"An invitation or permission to enter upon land
need not be express but may be implied from such
circumstances as the conduct of the possessor, the
arrangement of the premises, or local custom."
Turning then to the facts of this case, there was abundant evidence to support a finding of such an invitation .
. There is no question but that the status of plaintiff and
Droubay, his employer, were the same, since at the time of
his injury, plaintiff was acting under the direction of and
in behalf of Droubay. See Perl v. Cohodas, Peterson, Paoli,
Nast Co., 295 Mich. 325, 294 N. W. 697, 700 (1940). As
to the area where Droubay, plaintiff's employer, parked
and loaded his trucks with defendant's products and other
places on defendant's premises where business was actually
transacted, there is no question but that plaintiff was a
business visitor. As to those areas, the invitation was express and the mutual benefit obvious beyond doubt. Does
this status change when the plaintiff, or his employer, is
using the washing ramp or platform which is located in the
same enclosed yard although admittedly some 100 to 150
feet from the pumps and loading docks? This Court has, on
several occasions, indicated that where there is an invitation to enter part of one's premises or to enter one's premises generally, the question as to the extent or scope of this
invitation and as to what portions of the property the in-
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vitation affects is one of foreseeability as to where the
business visitor might reasonably be expected to go.

Hayward v. Downing, supra, at page 445;
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah
474, 483, 69 P. 2d 502 (1937).

And in In re Wimmer's Estate, supra, at page 4~1, it is
stated:
"A business visitor does not become a trespasser merely because his injury occurs while he is
not at the very place he is working. He is entitled to
use such other parts of the premises as necessary or
reasonably incidental to the work he is required to
perform. The deceased was not only entitled to use
the area where he was actually carrying on his work,
he was also entitled, without losing his status as a
business visitor, to use such other places on the premises as would have some reasonable connection with
his work * * · * "
In the comment to Restatement of the Law of Torts,
Sec. 343 dealing with the liability owed to a business visitor
it is provided :
"Where it is customary that customers or patrons shall be free to go to certain parts of the premises, the customer or patron is a business visitor
thereon unless the possessor exercises reasonable
care to apprise the customer or patron that the
area of invitation is more narrowly restricted."~
Comment (b) .
Whether or not plaintiff was invited or permitted to
use the area where he was injured was a question of fact,
properly submitted to the jury.
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., supra, at pages 482,
483.
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The following facts in this case conclusively support the
finding of the jury of an invitation or implied permission
on the part of the defendant to let Droubay and his employees use this washing ramp and equipment:
1. The customary practice of obtaining permission.
Droubay, a witness, obviously friendly to defendant (R.
111) testified that it was his customary practice to ask
and receive permission from some of defendant's employees
in the building adjacent to the ramp, to use the same (R.
86). Droubay could not recall whether or not on this particular date such permission had been obtained (R. 86).
Defendant offered no evidence to the effect that such permission had not been requested and granted on the day
plaintiff was injured. The jury could reasonably have inferred from this "customary practice" that this same practice was followed on the day in question and that permission was expressly obtained. Where express permission is
given, the question of benefit to the owner, discussed subsequently, becomes less important.

2. The continued use by Droubay and his employees of
this ramp for washing their trucks. As indicated in the
comment to Restatement, Torts, Sec. 332, an invitation
may be implied from "local custom or persistent course of
conduct." See also comment to Restatement, Torts, Sec.
343, quoted supra. No evidence was introduced at the trial
to show lack of knowledge, on the part of defendant, of
Droubay's continued use of this ramp after defendant took
over the Woods Cross facility. On the contrary, one of defendant's officials admitted to have had knowledge of such
use (R. 201). Droubay used the ramp on an average of
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every six weeks for each of its five trucks or a total use of
approximately three times per month. Never during this en.
tire time had defendant objected to this use (R. 60). What
clearer evidence could be produced to show that defendant
permitted and acquiesced in the use of this area by Droubay? At any time had it so desired, defendant could have
prohibited this conduct. Defendant attempted to rebutt
this argument by showing that Droubay had paid to have
his trucks cleaned elsewhere, but the only instance testified
to occurred subsequent to the commencement of this action
(R. 91). That an invitation may be implied from continued
use and failure of the defendant to post signs or otherwise
prohibit said use, see Eklund v. Kapitos, 216 Minn. 79, 11
N. W. 2d 805 (1943).
3. The location of the ramp and its prior use. The
jury could reasonably have inferred from the location of
this ramp that Droubay was impliedly invited to use it.
It was located in the same enclosed yard as Droubay used
to load his trucks and it was in the same area as the office
building and parking area, leased by defendant to Droubay (R. 36). The exact location of the parking area was
not fixed by the lease or established at trial, although its
dimensions were given. Droubay had never been lead to
believe that he was confined in his operations to any par- ,
ticular area of defendant's premises (R. 112-113). Its
convenient location, coupled with the fact that Droubay
had used the ramp while an employee of Wasatch Oil Com- ,
pany prior to defendant's purchase of the property, could
reasonably have lead him to believe that he was permitted
and invited to continue using the same. At the time de-

1
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fendant purchased this property and sold its trucks to Droubay, it could easily have given notice that he should henceforth cease using it. So far as this record is concerned,
defendant did not do so. This implied invitation is further
strengthened by the close business relationship existing
between Droubay and defendant together with the mutual
benefit derived from Droubay's continued use of the ramp.
Some authorities have taken the view that if the defendant benefits from the plaintiff's presence upon its property, this is alone sufficient to support a finding of an
implied invitation. 65 C. J. S., Negligence, Sec. 43 (3)b.
See Hayward v. Downing, Supra, at page 445, in which
benefit to the defendant was used to support the contention that there was an invitation to the particular area
where the plaintiff was injured. See also, Nevada Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, Supra.
As to the question of mutual benefit, it is clear under
the above definition that in order for a person to be classified as a business visitor, his presence upon the property
need only indirectly benefit the owner. See In re Wimmer's
Estate, Supra, in which a workman was held to be a business visitor even though at the time of his injury he was
engaged in retrieving his hat from an area outside of the
place he had been working. The court in that case found
sufficient benefit to the property owner. In the present
case, there were many facts from which a jury could have
found that defendant benefited from Droubay and his em-
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ployees using the washing facilities. Among those facts
are the following :

i

1. Droubay's trucks were painted with defendant's
colors and trade name and he had been specifically instructed by defendant's sales department that these trucks
should be kept clean (R. 117). The use of Droubay's trucks
on the highways undoubtedly provided defendant with a
source of advertising. To the uninformed, these trucks, for
all purposes, appear to be those of the defendant. If they
were maintained in a dirty and unkempt condition, it would
reflect upon defendant's reputation. Defendant was thus
clearly benefited by Droubay's having a convenient place to
wash and care for his trucks. Having facilities in defendant's yard made it possible for Droubay to clean his trucks
in the same area as he maintained his office and where
the trucks were parked and loaded.

2. Droubay was a consignee and distributor of defendant's products (R. 90). There was a close business relationship between them (R. 33). He was defendant's distributing agent, and the maintenance of a friendly and
amicable relation between them was important to both.
Defendant was able to favor Droubay by making this area
available for his use. Had it not felt that some benefit
would be derived by allowing this use by him, it had ample
opportunity to object to its being so used. The use of the
wash ramp admittedly saved Droubay money, and the efficiency of his operations were no doubt improved since he
would otherwise have had to pay to have his trucks cleaned
some distance away. A manufacturer is obviously benefited by the continued successful operation of its distribu·
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tor's business since the marketing of its products are dependent upon such distributors.
3. Droubay was a lessee of the defendant's property
(R. 84). Rent was paid directly, or as a credit against the
purchase of the building Droubay rented, to defendant. A
lessor is naturally benefited by the satisfied use of his
property by its lessee. The providing of this ramp made
the leased premises that much more attractive and useful
to Droubay.
All of the above factors lead to only one conclusiondefendant was clearly and unmistakably benefited by the
use of the washing ramp or platform by Droubay or his
employees. This, coupled with the implied invitation, tacit
permission and long acquiescence, furnishes abundant evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was a business visitor upon defendant's property at the time he was injured.
The jury in this case so found upon instructions clearly and
correctly stating the law of this State. The evidence not
only sufficiently, but conclusively, supported this finding.

(b)

Defendant violated the duty of care
owed to one in plaintiff's status.

The duty of care owed to a business visitor or invitee is
the highest standard of care imposed upon a land owner.
Not only has an owner the duty to warn the business visitor
of known hazards or to avoid from actively harming him,
but he is required by law to inspect and maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor
of any dangerous conditions so that he might conduct himself safely thereon.
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The Restatement of the Law of Torts, after setting
forth the general liability of the land possessor to all
licenseees whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees,
states in Section 343 the special liability to a business
visitor:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural
or artificial condition thereon, if but only if, he
" (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable
care could discover, the condition which, if known ,
to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and
"
"(b) has no reason to believe that they will
discover the condition or realize the risk involved
therein, and
" (c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasonable
care
"' (i) to make the condition reasonably
safe, or
"' (ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without relinquishing any of the services which they are entitled
to receive, if the possessor is a public utility'." ..

1

In discussing what a business visitor is entitled to expect, Comment (d) to the above section provides at page

942:
"A business visitor is entitled to expect that the
possessor will take reasonable care to ascer~ain t~e
actual condition of the premises and, havmg diS·
covered it, either to make it reasonably safe by repair or to give warning of the actual condition and
the risk involved therein."
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As noted supra, the provisions of the Restatement on
this subject have been adopted by this Court. See In re
Wimmer's Estate, Supra, at page 452 in which the above
section is quoted and approved.
The defendant, Phillips Petroleum Company, maintained on its property, next to the ramp used for washing
trucks, a vat containing a hot caustic soda solution (R.
60). This ramp is barely wide enough for a truck of the
type involved to be parked thereon and still leave room for
a man using the steam cleaning equipment to walk around
it (R. 102, 125, 155). The caustic soda vat is located
just 2 inches from the edge of this ramp and stood from
13 to 14 inches above the surface of the ramp (R. 139).
There would be less than 2 feet between a truck parked on
the ramp, in the usual position, and the edge of this vat.
There were other tanks and objects usually littering this
area (R. 127). Defendant knew, when it purchased these
premises, that this ramp was used for steam cleaning trucks
and continued to so use it for the same purpose (R. 58, 59).
Despite this knowledge, after acquiring this property, defendant constructed or placed this vat in this hazardous
location (R. 60). One operating the steam cleaning equipment, which is located on the opposite side of the ramp
than the vat, would normally be unable, from that location,
to see the vat because of the truck. Droubay himself did
not see the vat on the day in question (R. 74). The steam
cleaning equipment, when in operation, greatly affected
the vision of one using it (R. 131). The defendant was required by law to make its premises safe for those making
a customary and reasonable use of such equipment.
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The vat did have a cover attached to it when visited
several months after the accident. No one testified that
this cover was attached to the vat at the time plaintiff was
injured (R. 74). Even if the cover was attached, someone
had left it open on the day in question. Plaintiff or his
employer never used or had occasion to use this vat (R.
61). It was used exclusively by defendant's employees in
cleaning pump parts. If the cover was attached, the jury
clearly was warranted in finding that one of defendant's
employees had carelessly left it open on the morning of
January 18, 1952, or prior thereto.
The argument that this vat was plainly visible to one
using the area ignores the use to which this concrete ramp
or platform was put and the nature of the vat and its
contents. The ramp, as previously noted, was used for
steam cleaning trucks and the vision of those so using it
was normally impaired to some extent by the steam. Secondly, even had one observed the vat, he would not have been
aware of its highly dangerous contents. Defendant's conduct must be considered in the light of its knowledge as to
the use made of the ramp.
The question of whether or not defendant violated the
above described duty of care was clearly one for the jury.
The jury, in finding for the plaintiff, necessarily concluded
that defendant had failed to live up to this standard in
maintaining an open vat of caustic soda in an area where
men were known to be working with steam cleaning equipment. The basic factor in determining whether or not a
given act or course of conduct constitutes negligence is
whether the risk of harm outweighs the utility of such
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conduct. Prosser on Torts, Sec. 35. The alternatives available to the defendant are important in this respect. Here the
defendant's conduct created a very great risk of the most
serious and painful type of harm to those working in the
area. While this v.at was no doubt useful and possibly neces' sary to the conduct of defendant's business, its utility would
not have been materially affected by altering its location so
as to place it outside of the area where persons using the
wash ramp would be likely to step or stumble into it. Even
assuming there was ne other convenient place to locate such
a vat, there was nothing to prevent the defendant from
erecting some type of barrier or fence around the vat or at
least posting conspicuous signs or warnings so those using
the area would be appraised of the vat's presence and its
contents. The defendant's position that to post signs or
to erect a barrier would have been a useless act is com.Pletely untenable. Had there been a conspicuous sign
posted, the plaintiff could easily have been warned of this
hazard when he drove onto the ramp. The argument that
plaintiff would have been more seriously injured had he
stumbled into a barrier ignores the fact that plaintiff's
injuries were not caused by a fall or stumble, but by the
acid in the vat. Defendant had never given Droubay or
his employees any instructions or warnings regarding the
vat, or when it might be in use and the lid open (R. 75-76).
The case was submitted to the jury on the theory that
if and only if plaintiff was a business visitor could recovery
be allowed. This was the issue framed by the pleadings and
the issue on which the trial proceeded. The appellant lays
great stress on the contention that if plaintiff were a li-
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censee, the defendant would have violated no duty of care.
The tenor of this argument seems to concede that if plaintiff were a business visitot, defendant did violate the
standard of care owed to him. One pages 20 and 21 of
appellant's brief reference is made to the Restatement of
the Law of Torts' provisions as to the duty owed to the
licensee. The portion cited, however, is not the section
of the Restatement, but only two paragraphs from the comment thereunder. So that this Court might be fully advised
on the subject, Section 342 of the Restatement of the Law
of Torts reads as follows:

"A possessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
"(a) knows of the condition and realizes that
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has
reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and
"(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable
care
" ' ( i) to make the condition reasonably
safe, or
"' (ii) to warn them of the condition and
the risk involved therein'."

There was no doubt under the evidence in this case
that defendant knew of the caustic soda vat and of its
location next to the washing ramp. The jury might reasonably have inferred that defendant also knew that it created
an unreasonable risk to one using the steam cleaning equip-
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ment on said ramp and that such a person might not discover the condition or realize the risk involved. It is also
clear that defendant did nothing to either make this condition reasonably safe (on the contrary the lid was left
open) or to warn the plaintiff of the condition and the
risk involved therein. While the land owner owes the licensee no duty to inspect the premises to discover defects,
there is a duty to protect or warn against known dangerous
conditions. The comment to the above section in the Restatement contains many similar illustrations of conditions
under which the land owner may be liable to a licensee.
Thus, had plaintiff been deemed a licensee, recovery might
still have been justified. Even if plaintiff had been deemed
a trespasser, which no construction of the facts in this
case would justify, liability might still have been predicated on the rationale of this Court in Martin v. Jones,
... Utah ... , 253 P. 2d 359 (1953). The fact remains
however, that the only issue raised by the pleadings and at
the trial was whether the plaintiff was a business visitor.
The question raised by appellant in Point I of its brief
is whether or not this case was properly submitted to the
jury. If under any fair construction of the evidence in the
record, the jury was warranted in finding that defendant
was a business visitor and that defendant had violated
the standard of care owed to such a person, then the judgment of the trial court must stand. In determining a question of this kind, the Supreme Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In Els-
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wood v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 82 Utah
235, 23 P. 2d 925, 927 (1933), this Court stated:
"In deciding the questions of whether or not a
nonsuit should have been granted or a verdict directed for the defendant we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In testing
the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to those
questions the defendant stands in the position of
admitting the truth of the plaintiff's evidence, and
all reasonable inferences which the jury might fairly draw therefrom favorable to the plaintiff."

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Before the issue of contributory negligence may be
taken from the jury and the plaintiff be deemed guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the defendant's burden of proving both that plaintiff was negligent
and that such negligence proximately contributed to cause
his injury must be met and established with such certainty
that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary. If
there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack of
evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences
arising therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which reasonable minds may conclude that they
are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence either
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or that
such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, the
question must be submitted to the jury. Martin v. Stevens,
.. Utah ... , 243 P. 2d 747, 749 (1952). Under the evidence presented in this case, it would clearly have been
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error for the trial court to have concluded that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
It is academic that in determining whether or not
plaintiff was negligent at the time he was injured the
standard used is that of a reasonable man under all of the
circumstances. Prosser on Torts, Section 36. It isn't a
question of how a reasonable man would have conducted
himself on this washing ramp on an average day with no
obstruction to his vision. The question is rather what a
reasonable man steam cleaning his employer's truck on a
January day, with clouds of white steam being emitted
from the nozzle in his hands, would have done. His experience in using the equipment and his knowledge of the area
must also be considered.

The plaintiff testified that he did not observe the vat
when he drove the truck onto the washing ramp (R. 127).
For that matter, neither did Droubay observe the vat on
that particular day (R. !'4). There was evidence as to why
plaintiff did not see it. It was the first time he had been
in the vicinity of the ramp (R. 127). He was required by
his employer to watch closely to his left to protect defendant's property; there were objects and trash in the
area that tended to obstruct his view (R. 126, 127, 142).
Even had he seen it, which he did not, he would not have
known the hazard<?us nature of its contents (R. 127). After
returning from lunch and beginning to work on the truck,
his employer started the equipment and cleaned part of the
truck (R. 69, 70) . Plaintiff had never used this type of
equipment before (R. 127). The nozzle sent forth a large
spray and cloud of steam (R. 131). Indeed, that was the
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purpose of the equipment, the reason it was there and the
use normally made of the ramp. As the plaintiff cleaned
around the truck and while the steam from the equipment
and from the vat obscured his vision, but while he could
still feel the side of the truck against his right hip, he
struck his left leg against the side of the vat, causing him
to fall forward, and in order to regain his balance, lifted
his left leg over the edge and stepped into the vat.
Defendant lays great stress on the fact that had plaintiff turned the nozzle into the air and to one side and waited
for the steam to clear, he could have observed the tank.
The fact that there was an alternative available does not
answer the question. The jury in this case found, and
justly so, that it was not unreasonable for the defendant to
have proceeded around the truck as he did, operating the
equipment and keeping his hip against the fender of the
truck. The fact that he could have moved the nozzle does
not mean that it was unreasonable for him not to have done
so. This was a question for the jury. The jury could have
well concluded that plaintiff was entitled to assume that
the ramp and the area immediately surrounding it was
reasonably suited and maintained for doing the work the
defendant knew was per~ormed thereon. In this respect,
Comment (d) to Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts
is enlightening:
"A business visitor is entitled to expect that the
possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the
actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonably safe by repair or to give warning of the actual condition and
the risk involved therein. Therefore, a business
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visitor is not required to be on the alert to discover
defects which, if he were a bare licensee, entitled to
expect nothing but notice of known defects, he might
be negligent in not discovering. This is of importance in determining whether the visitor is or is not
guilty of contributory negligence in failing to discover a defect, as well as in determining whether the
defect is one of which the possessor should believe
that his visitor would not discover and as to which,
therefore, he must use reasonable care to warn the
visitor."
If it is found, as the jury' did in this case, that plaintiff
was a business visitor upon the defendant's premises, then
plaintiff is entitled to assume that the defendant has made
the premises safe for the purpose for which the plaintiff
is to use tl~m. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 199, p. 879, See
Larkin v. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 101, 83 Pac. 686
(1905).

Defendant relies upon the decision of this Court in
Knox v. Snow, ... Utah ... , 229 P. 2d 874 (1951), which
is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. Plaintiff in the Knox case fell into the grease pit at a service
station. In that case while the area was somewhat shaded
- and this was doubted - the plaintiff's vision was not
impaired as a result of his reasonably using the premises
for the very purpose for which he was invited upon the
property and for the purpose for which the area was designed and used, as in the present case. Further, in tbe
Knox case, the plaintiff was clearly aware of obstructions
in the area and had in fact stepped over some. The plaintiff in that case was observing other objects in the room
rather than watching where he was proceeding; he was
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familiar with the type of premises across which he was
walking and knew that such pits were commonly located
in such places. None of those factors were present in this
case. The plaintiff in the present case was not familiar
with the area where he was injured and his vision was impaired by the steam 'cleaning equipment he was using.
See Martin v. Jones, Supra, at'page 361 in which the K1w.r
case is distinguished on the same grounds set forth above.
The pronouncement of this Court in Baker v. Decker,
Utah ... , 212 P. 2d 679 (1949), answers defendant's
argument on this point. The plaintiff in that case was a
woman who resided in an apartment house. While leaving
her apartment one morning, she noticed that a painter and
house cleaner was working in the hall and that certain
equipment and a ruffled, uneven canvas, was on the floor.
She saw the canvas and yet as she stepped onto it caught
her right heel in a fold or wrinkle and tripped and fell.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and defendant appealed contending that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, since she was aware of the
danger and could have taken an alternate route. In re.jecting this contention, this Court quoted Tillotson v. City
of Davenport, 232 Iowa, 44, 4 N. W. 2d 365, 366:
"It is well settled that mere knowledge that a
walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, is not sufficient
to establish contributory negligence though there is
another way that is safe and convenient, and to defeat recovery it must appear that the traveler knew '
or as an ordinarily cautious person should have ·
known that it was imprudent to use the walk."
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Justice Latimer, speaking for the Court, further stated:
"The last contention to be disposed of deals
with the claim that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in stepping onto the canvas and
catching her heel. We must keep in mind that the
burden is upon the defendant to establish this claim
and that unless all reasonable minds must conclude
that Mrs. Baker was negligent in the manner in
which she attempted to get over the canvas the question of her due care must be submitted to the jury
for determination. We must also keep in mind that
this case falls within the category of cases dealing
with pedestrians who are subjected to unnecessary
hazards by the thoughtless conduct of others. Ordinary reasonable persons will trip over objects,
stumble over obstructions, slip on slick surfaces and
fall into holes or excavations. Even though they may
see the object they sometimes fail to comprehend
and anticipate the incident which precipitates the
injury. Usually whether a reasonable person would
have properly appraised the situation and escaped
injury is for a jury to determine. * * *
"The many variable factors to be considered in
this type of case are such that standard of due care
should be determined by the triers of the facts and
not by the court. The jury having found the issues
of negligence and contributory negligence in favor
of plaintiff and against defendant, the verdict and
judgment are affirmed."

J

It should be noted that the above decision requires that
plaintiff comprehend and anticipate the incident which pre- cipitates the injury. It isn't enough that he sees and
recognizes some danger in the situation. Clearly the plain-- tiff in this case did not comprehend and anticipate a hazard
such as caused his injury.
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In a recent decision of the United States Court of Ap..
peals, Tenth Circuit, in a case arising in Utah, the question
of contributory negligence was considered in the business
visitor situation. Swift and Company v. Schuster, 192 F.
2d 615 (lOth Cir. 1951). A government meat inspector at
appellant's plant was injured when he stepped down from
a platform 22 inches high on which he was standing and
slipped and fell on the wet, greasy floor. Defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiff contending that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and had assumed
the risk. There were alternative means theplaintiff could
have used to accomplish his purpose. In affirming the trial
court and after distinguishing the case of Knox v. Snow,
Supra, the Court stated at page 618:
"We think the test to be applied in this case is
laid down by the Supreme Court in M osheuvel v.
District of Colymbia, 191 U. S. 247, 24 S. Ct. 57, 63,
48 L. Ed. 170. In that case the plaintiff, in descending to the street, attempted to step over an uncovered water-box in the sidewalk and was injured.
There were ways .availa?le for her to walk ar?und
1
the water-box on either side. She was fully cogmzant '
of the situation and had used the sidewalk on many
occasions, sometimes walking around the box and
sometimes stepping over it. In reversing the 1
lower court barring recovery, on the ground that I
she had knowingly and wilfully assumed the risk, ~
the Supreme Court said: 'Coming to apply such ·
principle, the question is this, was the situation of
the water-box and the hazard to result from ~n .attempt to step over it so great that the plambff,
with the knowledge of the situation, could not, as a
reasonably prudent person, have elected to step ,
across the box, instead of stepping to the sidewalk
I

I

I

I
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from either side of the tread of the last step? And
this, we think, was, under the undisputed proof, a
question for the jury, and not for the court.' See
also McCready v. Southern Pac. Co., 9 Cir. 26 F. 2d
569 and 9 Cir., 47 F. 2d 673.
"Applying these principles to the case in hand,
we conclude that the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the
jury and that its verdict and the judgment entered
thereon must be affirmed."
The facts in the above case were much more favorable
_ to the defendant than in the present case since the plaintiff there had used the area many times previously and
was familiar with the condition causing his injury and
had knowledge of its presence. In this case there was uncontradicted evidence to the effect that plaintiff did not
see the caustic soda vat and that his failure to see it and
recognize the danger was not due to .negligent conduct on
his part.
On the question of when a trial judge should take the
.- question of contributory negligence from the jury, the law
- in this state is settled. In the recently decided case of
- Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., . . . Utah ... , 251
P. 2d 867, 870 (1952) this Court, in reversing the decision
"' of the trial court in granting a Motion to Dismiss on the
. ~ ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
reviewed and summarized the authoritiies as follows :
"The authorities frequently state that the question of contributory negligence is usually for the
jury. And that this is so wherever the evidence is
such that reasonable minds may differ as to its existence has been stated innumerable times, which is
undoubtedly correct. However, in view of the fact
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that before the issue may be taken from the jury,
the defendant has the burden of establishing plaintiff's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence
it may be a bit more precise to state that the question of contributory negligence is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that jurors, acting fairly
and reasonably, may say that they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately
contributed to cause his own injury.

*

*

*

"These principles apply in identical fashion to
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence
except that the defendant has the burden of proof.
That the evidence is such that the jury may find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff failed to use due care for his own safety
is not sufficient. The proof must establish his
failure to do so with such certainty that all reasonable minds must conclude before the court may rule
as a matter of law that he is precluded from recovery on that ground. The court should exercise caution and forbearance in considering taking questions
of fact from the jury."
See also:

Newton v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.,
43 Utah 219, 134 Pac. 567 (1913);

Martin v. Stevens, ... Utah ... , 243 P. 2d :
747, 749 (1952).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.
The only question raised as to admissibility of evi·
dence relates to certain portions of the testimony in the
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deposition of plaintiff taken prior to trial. Defendant
sought to tender this evidence at the trial for the purpose
of showing "some inconsistency" in his testimony or admissions on the part of the plaintiff. Objection was made to
the admission of said evidence on the ground that it was
repetitious and that it was not contradictory of anything
to which plaintiff had testified. The substance of the testimony offered was to the effect that plaintiff could see the
parts of the truck being cleaned by moving the nozzle away,
raising it up in the air and waiting a short while; that the
steam was directed towards the under-carriage o~ the truck
at the time of the accident and that by turning the steam
into the air he could have seen the fender next to his hip
and that if he had raised the nozzle above his head he probably could have seen his surroundings.
Appellant relies upon Rule 26 (d) U. R. C. P. stating
that the same permits the deposition of a party to be used
by an adverse party for any purpose. It must first be
noted however, that what is said in Rule 26 (d) (2) is
necessarily qualified by the general introductory statement
in Rule 26 (d) that makes a deposition admissible at trial
only "so far as admissible under the rules of evidence."
See Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 655, Vol. 2, p. 346. Thus if the evidence sought to be introduced was inadmissible under the rules of evidence, then
it gains no hallowed stature merely because it was embodied
in the deposition of a party. It should also be noted that
Rule 26 (e) allows objection to be made at the trial to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any
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reason which would require its exclusion if the witness were
testifying.
The appellant implies in its brief that the trial court
sustained the objection to certain portions of the plaintiff's
deposition without knowing the content thereof. The line
of testimony thus far however, had already revealed its substance. While the objection was sustained in the presence of
the jury, the Court, during the recess, listened to the proferred evidence and again reaffirmed its position (R. 170-

~

172).
The evidence sought to be admitted by tendering the
deposition was evidence the Court previously had excluded
on cross-examination as repetitious (R. 170). If the trial
court was correct in excluding the evidence offered from the
witness on cross-examination, then clearly under the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, above noted, the deposition was likewise properly refused. The evidence was objected to on cross-examination as being repetitious and in no
way contradictory. An examination of· the record shows
this to be true. As noted above, the substance of the testimony2 the exclusion of which appellant complains of on
pages 36 to 38 of its brief, is that by moving the nozzle in
another direction a person could, at least to some extent,
see the area in which he was working. On direct examination plaintiff had testified as follows:
"A. Then I tried to ciean this truck, the back
dual wheel on the outside of the wheel it was very
sticky, I ~ould keep the nozzle very close to it to
make the steam efficient; it didn't clean it when
you hold it far away.
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"Then I went over to the left front wheel,
cleaned the outside of that wheel, cleaned the inside of that front wheel, across the front axle, I
cleaned the inside of the front wheel the best I could,
taking the no.z.zle azcay and putting it back down
again.
"Q. Standing in front of the truck at that
time?
"A. Yes, sir, bending over, looking at the
wheel, and pouring the steam, and then I took the·
nozzle away from the inside of the front wheel
several times and put it back to give it a little bit
more cleaning" (R. 132) .

On cross-examination defendant's counsel had ques-- tioned the witness and read portions of plaintiff's deposi·- tion to the following effect :
"Q. This steam, that obscured your vision, is
steam that came from this nozzle you were using,
was it not?
"A. Part of it was, yes.
"Q.

source?
"A.

Was there any part came from any other
Yes, sir.

Where was that?
"A. It came from underneath the truck from
the northeast around the side of the front wheel
where I had been cleaning, the steam was coming
off of cold metal.
"Q.

"Q. Before the steam cleared away, you moved
around the area where you had no visibility?
''A. Poor visibility all around me there.
"Q. When you started to clean around in the
front of the truck, hmv could you tell whether or
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not the part you had been cleaning, or the undercarriage had been sufficiently cleaned?
"A. I knew if I waited a minute the steam
would clear, and put steam on it again and more or
less take it for granted the last dose I had given
enough to have it cleaned.
"Q. As you handed this nozzle to the undercarriage, you turned it to one side, you turned the
steam nozzle away and looked at the part you were
working on?
"A. Some of the time turned it up in the air and
waited for the steam to disappear.
"Q. That is right. How often did you turn it
up in the .air?
"A. After you had gone over quite an area.
"Q. You turned it up in the air so the steam
would clear out of your vision?
"A. I don't know; I didn't know too much
about handling this ; I don't know how often I turned it up in the air.
"Q. Mr. Droubay had demonstrated to you
how to work, had he not?
"A. I watched him, I imagine you could call
it 'deriwnstration.
"Q. As you walked, or as you moved toward
the south, were you as you moved toward the south,
able to see anything as you hit the tank with your
foot?
"A. I was trying to move toward the west.
"Q. As you moved toward the front, you had
to move toward the front to get to the west, didn't
you?
"A. About one step to the south.
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"Q.

"A.

Could you see to the west?
No, I can't remember as I could.

"Q. Well, wasn't the steam so thick at that
time you couldn't see where you were going?
"A. Well, it was very dense, hard to see, I
imagine you could see, it was difficult to see where
I was going, very difficult.
"Q. Wasn't it because Mr. Rogalsky [sic], you
turned this steam nozzle down to your left just before
you moved over to the tank?

*

*

*

"A. No, sir. Immediately after I pulled the
nozzle, I had looked and seen the wheel through a
fog and seen some sticky grease being removed, some
was loose and going to be removed, a hose would
take it off; I took it off and gave it another little
shot and took the nose off the front wheel and I
don't know whether I put it up in the air and started
to walk around; I knew it was the fender. I could
feel it with my elbow and hip, and I wanted to get
done before the day was over.
"Q. Is it your testimony you did not turn the
steam hose down to your left in the direction of that
tank?
"A. I don't remember, sir.

*

*

*

"MR. REIMAN : I want to show what he testified on the desposition, Your Honor, how he held
the steam nozzle,- how it pulled it away from the part ·
he was working on. He said he assumed it was clean,
and I want to go on. May I?
"THE COURT: You may.
"Q.

(by Mr. Reiman) Line 22:
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"Q. You mentioned that the steam obscured your view a little. How were you able
to tell what parts had been satisfactorily cleaned?
"A. I would move the steam cleaning nozzle away from that area, and look at it. If it
was not clean I would put it back.

You so testified, did you not on deposition?
I guess I did.

"Q.

"A.

"Q. So that your vision was obstructed or obscured only in the direction in which you were shooting the steam; is that it?
"A. Yes, in that direction, and in and about
that direction or area, it was rather tall and it took
in quite an area * * *" (R. 165-167-169, 170).
(Emphasis added.)
I

The portion of the record quoted above was already
before the jury for its consideration. Counsel for defendant were seeking to argue the possible inferences to be
drawn from this testimony by having it continually repeated. The evidence was sufficiently before the jury to
form a basis for any argument defendant may have wished
to make from it without the necessity of such repetition.
An examination of the above quotations from the
record clearly shows that the information sought to be
shown by the excluded evidence set forth on pages 36 to
38 of appellant's brief had at least twice previously been
given by the witness. The portions which defendant sought
to introduce from the deposition added nothing to what
was already before the jury. It was entirely within the
trial court's discretion to refuse the presentation of this
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evidence for the third or fourth time. That the trial judge
has discretion to exclude cumulative or repetitious evidence
is well settled.
"The Court may properly prevent a witness
from repeating testimony which he has already given." 53 Am. J ur., Trial, Section 106.
In accord see :
Parry v. Harris, 93 Utah 317, 320, 72 P. 2d
1044 (1937) ;
Litt v. Litt, 75 Cal. App. 2d 242, 170 P. 2d 684

(1946) ;

.

Minder v. Rowley, 35 Wash. 2d 92, 211 P. 2d
170 (1949);
Klinginsmith v. Allen, 155 Neb. 674, 53 N. W.
2d 77 (1953).

::

Apart from the discretionary authority of the trial
judge to exclude such repetitious evidence, it is clear that
since the substance of the evidence was already before the
jury the defendant could not possibly have been prejudiced
by its exclusion.
POINT IV.

.·.
.•:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR IN REFUSING
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS.
The main contention made by the defendant as to the
instructions of the trial court to the jury relate to its re-
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fusal to give defendant's requested Instructions No. 1-10
as submitted. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 is
largely a statement of what defendant's theory as to the
case was, and in substance was covered by Instructions No.
2 and No. 10 given by the trial court. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 2 merely repeats certain evidentiary
matter defendant had offered in evidence. This evidence
was before the jury and did not warrant a specific instruction.
Substantial portions of defendant's requested instructions relating to the definition of and duty of care owed to
a business visitor or invitee were embodied within the
court's Instructions No.· 10 and 11, which correctly instructed the jury in accordance with the law of this state.
In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 182 P. 2d 119 (1947);
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P.
2d 502 (1937). The instructions given by the trial court
in this case are in complete accord with the instructions
approved by this Court in the above cases and the principles stated therein. Appellant fails to point out any
error in the instructions given by the Court, or is it seriously contended that said instructions do not correctly
state the law.
The balance of defendant's requested instructions all
relate to the standard of care owed to one who is not a
bu~iness visitor. The principal contention made by appellant is that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
jury, as requested by defendant, on the definition of a licensee and trespasser and the duty of care owed to such
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persons. Appellant cQntends that the instructions took
from the jury one of the primary issues in the lawsuit since
there was evidence from which the jury could have found
that plaintiff was a gratuitous licensee or even a trespasser.
As noted earlier in this brief, there may have been sufficient evidence offered to support a finding that plaintiff
was a licensee or trespasser, and also that defendant had
violated the duty of care owed to such a person. Even
assuming this, it is difficult to conceive how the defendant in this case could have been prejudiced by the failure
of the Court to so instruct. The issue which defendant
refers to as being "primary" was not even raised by the
pleadings in the case or at the trial. The trial court isn't
required to instruct the jury on every possible alternative
in a case.
The jury was instructed as to the duty of care owed
to a business visitor which is concededly the highest standard of care imposed on a landowner, but the burden placed
upon the plaintiff to bring himself within the category of
a business visitor is likewise the most difficult to meet.
The jury was clearly and specifically instructed by the
Court in its Instruction No. 5 (R. 247) that:
"If you find from the evidence that the defendant was not negligent, or that plaintiff was not a
business visitor of defendant, or that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence, as the term
is elsewhere defined for you, then your verdict shall
be for the defendant, no cause of action" (Emphasis
added).
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Under this instruction it was mandatory that the jury
first find that plaintiff was a business visitor before
covery could be allowed.

re-

Precisely the same contention made by the defendant
in this case as to the trial court's failure to instruct on its
theory that plaintiff was a licensee or trespasser has been
previously considered and answered by this Court. Skerl
V. Willow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 502
(1937). In that case, while there was no specific request
made by the defendant at trial for instructions as to the
other categories, the same argument was made on appeal
as appellant makes in its brief. On pages 484 this Court
stated:
"Under the instructions a verdict for plaintiff
indicates that the jury could not have found other
than the plaintiff was a invitee or permitee, which
of necessity negatives the position of her being a
trespasser. The main point for the jury to determine
was whether the plaintiff was an invitee. The jury
were instructed that, if plaintiff was not an invited
person, she was not entitled to recover. It would
have tended to confuse the issues and the jury to
have added instructions as to licensees and trespassers."
In any event, the instructions requested by the defendant did not correctly state or apply the law. A detailed
examination of said instructions reveal that in neither substance or effect do they state the law of this state, or that
se forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, as to the
liability of a landowner to a licensee. The appellant's contention that there was no evidence to support the instruc·
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tions as to business visitors is answered earlier in this brief
under Point I where the various factors are enumerated
from which a jury could have and did find that plaintiff
was a business visitor.
The instructions given by the trial court in this case
clearly presented to the jury the issues raised by the evidence. It is respectfully submitted that the defendant, under
no view of the case, could have been prejudiced by the trial
court's failure to give instructions as to the liability owed
to a licensee or trespasser. Instructions to that effect were
not warranted under the issues raised by the pleadings and
would have only tended to confuse the jury. The instructions as given gave the defendant every advantage possible
under the evidence introduced.
POINT V.
THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN PARTIES THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY AND
BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND.
Plaintiff filed this action, with the express approval
and consent of the State Insurance Fund. Subsequent to
defendant's filing its Motion to Dismiss and Make More
Certain, plaintiff filed with the Court a letter addressed
to plaintiff's counsel which states that a total of $416.52
had been paid by the State Insurance Fund, part directly to
the plaintiff and the balance to the hospital, and that:
"You are authorized to represent the interest
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cure reimbursement to the fund for the amounts
which the State Insurance Fund has been required
to pay in this case, it being our understanding that
Mr. Rogalski's accident was caused by the fault of
a third party" (R. 9).
This letter merely confirmed a prior understanding of
the parties. It was filed in this action prior to the defendant's answer and was before the Court when it heard and ,
denied defendant's Motion. The parties argued the question '
fully and after considering the matter, particularly the
above letter, the trial court concluded that the State Insurance Fund would be bound by the judgment in this case.
It is defendant's contention that Section 35-1-65, U.
C. A. (1953) required the State Insurance Fund to be
named as a party plaintiff in the present action and that
any cause of action was in said agency. The concluding
paragraph to Point V of appellant's brief states that there
is nothing to prevent the State Insurance Fund from maintaining a separate action against the defendant. This, of
course, is the only way defendant could be prejudiced by
the alleged defect.
Prior to 1945 this section provided that the employer
or insurance carrier, having paid compensation, "shall be
subrogated to the rights of such employee." Section 421-58, U. C. A. (1943). It further provided that before
being required to pay compensation, the employee could
be required to make a written assignment of the cause of,
action of the insurance carrier. Section 35-1-65, U. C. A.
(1953), as now written, provides that if compensation is
claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes ob-
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-

._

ligated to pay compensation, then said employer or l'arrier
shall become trustee of the cause of action against the
third party and may maintain the action either in its own
name or the name of the injured employee. The present
section has not been construed so as to indicate just what
must exist between the employee and the insurance carrier
prior to the commencement of the action and what must
be shown in the proceedings as to said relationship. The
legislature, however, certainly did not intend to alter the
conclusion reached by the cases decided under the former
section to the effect that the employee has a definite interest in the cause of action and that if the insurance
carrier waives any right under the cause of action or refuses to prosecute said action, the employee may himself
bring suit against the third party. It is likewise clear that
there is but one cause of action against the third party.
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114,
152 P. 2d 98 (1944) ;
Jay v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 150 F. 2d
247 (lOth Cir. 1945) ;
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P. 2d
777 (1946).
While in the Johanson case this Court stated that the
failure to join the insurance carrier was at the most only
a defect in parties that had been waived, the Court nevertheless made it clear that the injured employee (or as in
that case the dependents of a deceased employee) was a
real party in interest and where the carrier had waived its
right to subrogation said party could properly bring suit
to enforce the cause of action. In the Jay case, the United
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States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a defective and invalid assignment of its cause of action by the
insurance carrier to the injured employee nevertheless constituted a waiver of the insurance carrier's right to sue and
the employee could maintain the action in his own name.
There is no possib~e reason why the letter on file in the present case should not have the same effect. In the Cederloff
case this Court relied on the Johanson opinion in reaching
the conclusion in an analogous case that there was but one
cause of action and that there was no danger of a second
suit by the insurance carrier.
While the 1945 amendment to this section no doubt
was fostered by the insurance interests, one purpose of the
amendment was to make it clear that there is but one cause
of action against the third party. Certainly the legislature
did not intend to bar recovery by the employee and shield
the third party where the insurance carrier or the employer
refused to bring an action or waived its right to do so. There
is nothing to indicate that the legislature intended the insurance carrier to be named as a party plaintiff in every
action brought under this section. The contrary is expressly provided. Section 35-1-65, U. C. A. (1953); see
also Section 31-7-11, U. C. A. (1953). The parties will
generally prefer to have the action brought in the name of
the employee rather than be prejudiced by having the insurance company the named plaintiff. While it is no doubt
true that there must be come authorization by the insurance
carrier for the bringing of the action, the very language
of the section contemplates that this authorization need
not be manifested by the joinder of the carrier and em-
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ployee as plaintiff. Even though the section allows the
carrier as trustee to bring suit in the name of the employee,
the general law applicable to trusts would allow the beneficiarly to sue in his own name when the trustee refused
to prosecute the cause of action, or if the trustee conveyed
or released his interest in the trust res to the beneficiary.
Certainly, the letter by the State Insurance Fund should
be given this effect.
It is clear under the letter from the State Insurance

Fund that they authorized the bringing of this action in
the name of the employee. Both plaintiff and the State
Insurance Fund consider themselves bound by the ultimate
decision in this case. The interest of the State· Insurance
Fund in any judgment recovered is set forth in said letter.
It is clear under the authorities previously discussed that
where the employee brings an action as here and recovers
for the entire loss that he will hold in trust. for the insurance carrier, such portion of the recovery as belong to
said carrier. See Annotation, 157 A. L. R. 1242 at p. 1252.
It would be impossible, in light of the foregoing, for the
State Insurance Fund to maintain another action .against
this defendant.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff was entitled to recover for the injuries which
he sustained on defendant's premises. The issues of defendant's and plaintiff's respective negligence were properly
submitted to the jury and the jury was correctly instructed
on the law applicable to the facts presented. A careful examination and consideration of the exceptions raised by
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appellant's brief reveal no error in the trial of this case
and certainly there were no prejudicial errors committed
by the trial court. Under the authorities and arguments
presented herein, the judgment in this case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY,
DAVID E. SALISBURY,
MILTON A. OMAN,

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

Receiveu.d____,copies of the foregoing brief of respondent this
day of August, 1953.

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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